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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
All parties to the proceedings in the court below are identified in the caption on 
appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to this Court for review: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing 
Plaintiffs request to have prospective jurors complete a brief written Jury Questionnaire 
that was designed, in part, to ferret out potential biases regarding tort reform, or to ask 
such questions orally in voir dire. 
Standard of review: A trial court's management of jury voir dire is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Alcazar v. University of Utah Hospitals, et aL9 2008 UT App 222 ^|9, 
188 P.3d 490, 493; Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in plaintiffs' proposed Request for 
Submission of a Jury Questionnaire and for Reasonable Follow Up Voir Dire. (R. 596-
600; Exhibit 2.)1 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing 
defense counsel to refer in closing argument to an unrelated lawsuit of national notoriety 
1
 Plaintiffs Proposed Request for Submission of a Jury Questionnaire and for Reasonable 
Follow up Voir Dire are attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 2. Perhaps because it was 
submitted as an attachment to correspondence, the document was not docketed at the time 
of its initial filing. However, defendant acknowledged receiving it (R. 436), and it was 
incorporated in part by the trial court (R. 536 # 1, 2, 9, 11, 14 and R. 599-600, # 5-9). To 
clear up the record, plaintiff subsequently resubmitted another copy of the document 
without objection. (R. 599-600) 
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that was not in evidence and that was intended to appeal to the prejudice of the jury by 
stating, "That's how we get verdicts like the McDonald's case with a cup of coffee." 
Standard of review: The trial court's decision to allow defense counsel to refer to 
the McDonald's coffee case in closing argument is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1997), and State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 
1998). 
Preservation: Plaintiff objected on the record at the time of the prejudicial 
statement. (R. 695, p. 48:17-23) 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the trial court committed reversible error by granting 
Defendant's pre-trial Motion in Limine to Dismiss Norrine Boyle's loss of consortium 
claims under Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11. 
Standard of review: The trial court's order is reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference given to the trial court. Rinderknect v. Luck, 965 P.2d 564 (Utah App. 1998). 
Preservation: These issues were raised in Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion in Limine to Dismiss Plaintiff Norrine Boyle. (R. 326-355) 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
UCA §30-2-11: Action for consortium due to personal injury. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "injury" or injured" means a significant permanent injury 
to a person that substantially changes that person's lifestyle 
and includes the following: 
(i) a partial or complete paralysis of one or more of the 
extremities; 
(ii) significant disfigurement; or 
(iii) incapability of the person of performing the types 
of jobs the person performed before the injury; and 
(b) "spouse" means the legal relationship: 
(i) established between a man and a woman as 
recognized by the laws of this state; and 
(ii) existing at the time of the person's injury. 
(2) The spouse of a person injured by a third party on or after May 4, 
1997, may maintain an action against the third party to recover 
for loss of consortium. 
(3) A claim for loss of consortium begins on the date of injury to the 
spouse. The statute of limitations applicable to the injured person 
shall also apply to the spouse's claim of loss of consortium. 
(4) A claim for the spouse's loss of consortium shall be: 
(a) made at the time the claim of the injured person is made 
and joinder of actions shall be compulsory; and 
(b) subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities, and 
provisions applicable to the claims of the injured person. 
(5) The spouse's action for loss of consortium: 
(a) shall be derivative from the cause of action existing in 
behalf of the injured person; and 
(b) may not exist in cases where the injured person would not 
have a cause of action. 
(6) Fault of the spouse of the injured person, as well as fault of the 
injured person, shall be compared with the fault of all other 
parties, pursuant to Sections 78B-5-817 through 78B-5-823, for 
purposes of reducing or barring any recovery by the spouse for 
loss of consortium. 
(7) Damages awarded for loss of consortium, when combined with 
any award to the injured person for general damages, may not 
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exceed any applicable statutory limit on noneconomic damages, 
including Section 78B-3-410. 
(8) Damages awarded for loss of consortium which a governmental 
entity is required to pay, when combined with any award to the 
injured person which a governmental entity is required to pay, 
may not exceed the liability limit for one person in any one 
occurrence under Title 63G, Chapter 7, Governmental Immunity 
Act of Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition below 
Plaintiff John Boyle filed a Complaint on or about July 14, 2005, alleging that 
defendant was responsible for an automobile / pedestrian accident on July 22, 2004 in 
which Mr. Boyle was injured. (R. 1-5) Mr. Boyle's spouse, Norrine Boyle, was 
subsequently allowed to intervene as a plaintiff, alleging loss of consortium. (R. 105-05) 
On January 8, 2008, Defendant filed a Motion ip Limine requesting dismissal of 
Norrine Boyle's Loss of Consortium claim, arguing that Mrs. Boyle's claim lacked the 
necessary evidentiary support to meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-
2-11. (R. 240-316) In opposing the motion, Mrs. Boyle argued that Mr. Boyle's 
testimony was sufficient to establish both significant disfigurement and partial incapacity, 
either of which would meet the statutory threshold for loss of consortium. (R. 326-55) 
After oral argument, the trial court granted Defendant's Motion in Limine to dismiss 
Plaintiff Norrine Boyle's Loss of Consortium Claim (R. 528), entering an order to that 
effect on May 28, 2008. (R. 532-534) (attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 1).) 
Plaintiff John Boyle's claims for damages (defendant stipulated to liability) were 
tried to a jury from June 3-6, 2008. Prior to trial, both parties provided proposed Jury 
Questionnaires to the trial court. (R. 436-40; 596-600.) The court took these two sets of 
instructions, to which neither party objected, and culled and then combined them into one 
For convenience, and because Norrine Boyle's claim was dismissed prior to trial, 
plaintiffs are referred to collectively as "Plaintiff herein, except where otherwise stated. 
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document. During jury selection on June 3, 2008, the court conducted oral voir dire 
using the document it had created. The court declined to ask any of the Plaintiff s 
questions designed to reveal possible juror biases regarding tort reform, nor was Plaintiff 
afforded an opportunity to question the jurors on the tort reform issues. (R. 693, pp. 25-
98) 
Later, during closing argument, Defendant's counsel, arguing that Mr. Boyle's 
compensatory damage analysis would result in an excessive verdict, exclaimed, "That's 
how we get verdicts like in the McDonald's case with a cup of coffee." (R. 695, p. 
48:17-22) The trial court overruled Plaintiffs objection that the comment was not 
supported by the evidence and was prejudicial. (R. 695, pp. 48:23-49:5) 
Despite significant injuries, including a back surgery, the jury returned a verdict of 
only $62,500, including medical expenses, which included only $27,800 in non-economic 
damages. The trial court entered the Final Verdict on the Judgment June 20, 2008. (R. 
669-673) Plaintiffs timely appealed. (R.674-75) 
Facts 
On July 22, 2004, Plaintiff John Boyle was struck by a pick-up truck while he was 
in a crosswalk in front of a Smith's grocery store. (R. 241) Prior to trial, Defendant 
admitted liability for the accident. (R. 241) 
Mr. Boyle was originally treated by a chiropractor, but once an MRI revealed a 
ruptured disc at the L4-5 level in his lower back, he was referred to an orthopedic 
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surgeon, Junius J. Clawson. When non-surgical treatments failed, Dr. Clawson (assisted 
by Dr. Reed Fogg) performed back surgery on Mr. Boyle at Cottonwood Hospital on 
November 5, 2004. (R. 339-40) 
Dr. Clawson found, in performing the surgery, that Mr. Boyle's L5 nerve root was 
severely compressed by the herniation of the disc. It was Dr. Clawson's opinion that the 
disc herniation was caused by the July 22, 2004 auto-pedestrian accident. (R. 339-40) 
Although the surgery provided some relief, it proved to be largely unsuccessful. 
As a result, Mr. Boyle has been left with permanent chronic pain. Since the accident, Mr. 
Boyle has not been able to sleep in a bed and is only able to get limited sleep in a 
recliner. His lack of sleep causes problems with everything that he does. It has not 
precluded him from working at a sedentary job, but even at that kind of work, it has 
interfered with his productiveness and precluded him from working full eight hour days. 
He is not able to perform employment with any significant physical demands and can no 
longer even carry small baskets of golf balls. Prior to the accident, Mr. Boyle was an 
accomplished golfer, and, at one point in his adult life, worked as the golf pro at a golf 
course. Now, according to Mr. Boyle, his chronic pain and lack of sleep "permeates 
everything that I do." (R. 261-62) 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Boyle's wife of many years, Norrine, asserted a 
claim for loss of consortium. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to dismiss 
Norrine Boyle's claim. The Defendant admitted that Mr, Boyle had alleged a significant 
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permanent injury, and that whether it substantially changed his lifestyle was a disputed 
fact. (R. 363) However, Defendant argued that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff was not 
incapable of performing the "same types of jobs that he performed before the injury," and 
therefore no claim for loss of consortium could be made. (R. 363) The trial court 
dismissed Mrs. Boyle's claims as a matter of law. (R. 532-34) 
Subsequently, Mr. Boyle's claims proceeded to trial. Consistent with the court's 
Case Management Order, Plaintiff submitted a written request for examination of 
potential jurors. (R. 596-600) Because a substantial part of John Boyle's claims were for 
general damages for chronic pain, Plaintiff sought insight into the jurors' attitudes and 
potential biases regarding general damages and awards for pain and suffering. Plaintiffs 
proposed two-page questionnaire sought to explore, among other things, the jurors' 
attitudes concerning people who bring personal injury lawsuits (Section 4 and 5) ; their 
attitudes concerning money damages for pain and suffering (Section 6)4; and their 
attitudes concerning statutory limits on pain and suffering awards (Section 7)5. (R. 599) 
4: What are your feelings or opinions about people who bring personal injury lawsuits? 
5: If you were seriously hurt or injured by the negligence of another, would you 
sue? Please explain your answer: (R. 599) 
4
 6: If supported by the evidence, could you award money damages for 
a. Future physical pain D yes D no 
b. Mental anguish D yes a no 
c. The impact on a wife of partially disabling injuries to her husband? 
d. Future medical bills • yes D no 
If you answered NO to any of the above, please explain: (R. 599) 
5
 7. Do you believe the law should impose limits on money that can be awarded for pain 
and suffering: • yes a no If YES, what do you believe these limitations should 
be? (R. 599) 
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The trial court declined to use the questionnaire, or to ask Plaintiffs questions set forth in 
Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7. (R. 536) 
At trial, although the defendant admitted liability for causing the accident (R. 693, 
p. 6:20-21), the defense strategy centered on casting Mr. Boyle in a negative light for 
requesting a substantial amount of money for his injuries. This theme was carried too far 
in closing arguments where defense counsel (over objection) compared Mr. Boyle's 
claimed damages to those made in an unrelated 1994 case often referred to as the 
"McDonald's coffee case": 
Ms. Van Orman: It's a per diem analysis. HoW many days has it been 
since the accident? How many days for the rest of his life? And how much 
per day is that worth? That's what been done here. That's how we get 
verdicts like in the McDonald's case with a cup of coffee. 
(R. 695, p. 48:17-22) 
Plaintiffs counsel objected on the grounds that the statement addressed a matter 
not in evidence and was prejudicial, but the objection was overruled. (R. 695, pp. 48:17-
49:5) The jury returned a very low verdict of only $62,500, of which only $27,800 was 
awarded for general damages. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This court has consistently held that plaintiffs are entitled during jury voir dire to 
information regarding potential jurors attitudes gleaned from a jury questionnaire or other 
means to detect tort reform biases and to exercise peremptory challenges intelligently. 
Here, the trial court allowed injury-specific questions that aided the Defendant in the 
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exercise of his peremptory challenges, but did not allow any questions designed to ferret out 
jurors' potential biases regarding tort reform and personal injury lawsuits, prejudicing 
plaintiff. 
The plaintiff was further prejudiced in closing arguments when defendant referenced 
an unrelated, nationally notorious tort reform case, the "McDonald's coffee case." 
Defendant's mention of this case was intended to inflame the juror's prejudices regarding 
excessive damages being awarded, which was highly prejudicial to the plaintiff in this 
"damages only" lawsuit. 
Finally, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff Norrine Boyle's consortium claim 
prior to trial. As the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom show that Mr. Boyle 
was incapable of performing his two jobs in the same manner or to the same extent he was 
prior to the accident, which is sufficient to meet the statutory threshold for loss of 
consortium. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DECLINING TO ASK PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED VOIR 
DIRE QUESTIONS CONCERNING PROSPECTIVE JURORS' 
POTENTIAL BIASES REGARDING TORT REFORM. 
Pursuant to the Scheduling Order in place, Plaintiff provided the court with a 
proposed Request for Submission of a Jury Questionnaire and for Reasonable Follow Up 
Voir Dire which included his short, two-page, questionnaire. (R. 599-600) Shortly 
thereafter, the Defendant also submitted a Proposed Voir Dire. In that document, 
Defendant specifically did not "object to the questionnaire submitted by plaintiffs..." (R. 
436). The trial court, off the record, made the determination that it would create jury 
questions that it would then use to personally voir dire the jury. The court omitted 
Plaintiffs questions intended to elicit jurors' views regarding general damages and tort 
reform in general: 
4: What are your feelings or opinions about people who bring personal 
injury lawsuits? If supported by the evidence, could you award a large 
amount of money to the plaintiff in this cas£? 
5: If you were seriously hurt or injured by the negligence of another, 
would you sue? Please explain your answer: 
6: If supported by the evidence, could you award money damages for 
a. Future physical pain • yes • no 
b. Mental anguish a yes a no 
a The impact on a wife of partially disabling injuries to her 
husband? 
d. Future medical bills • yes • no 
If you answered NO to any of the above, please explain: 
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7. Do you believe the law should impose limits on money that can 
be awarded for pain and suffering: a yes a no If YES, what do you 
believe these limitations should be? 
(R. 599) 
Instead, the court asked the jury only the 15 questions that it had fashioned, none 
of which addressed tort reform. (See Addendum Exh. 3.) From the tenor and language 
of the questions asked, it appears that the trial court might have been attempt ing to 
identify jurors who might be subject to for cause challenges, but it wholly disregarded the 
Plaintiffs need to gather information to assist in exercising peremptory challenges. 
The only questions that were arguably designed to elicit responses regarding 
biases were the trial court's questions 13, 14 and 15: 
13. Do you have any feelings or beliefs that would prevent you 
from being fair and impartial regarding persons who have 
personal injury disputes and who choose to resolve those 
disputes by going to court? 
14. Do you have any personal religious or other beliefs that 
would prevent you from awarding damages in a large amount, 
small amount, or zero amount, if warranted and justified by 
the evidence and the law given you by the Court? 
15. Given all considerations and everything you know about this 
case so far, can you be fair, impartial, neutral, judge of the 
facts and follow the law as given to you by the Court? 
(R. 536) 
Not surprisingly, prospective jurors who were asked these general questions 
answered "No, No, and Yes," without elaboration. (R. 693, pgs. 33, 39, 41, 47, 51, 55-
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56, 61, 62, 64, 65, 70, 73, 79, 82, 84, and 89). The questions were neither designed to, 
nor did they, elicit any information about the individuals' views regarding personal injury 
lawsuits or tort reform. 
This Court has repeatedly reminded trial courts that parties are entitled to seek 
information from prospective jurors regarding their views on these issues. See Alcazar v. 
UofU Hospitals, 2008 UT App 222, ffif 5, 19, 188 P.3d 490 (noting "rather direct 
authority" and "prior, clear precedents" establishing plaintiffs' entitlement to voir dire 
questions regarding tort reform), citing Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991) 
and Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Alcazar, the trial court reviewed the plaintiffs' requested voir dire but declined 
to ask the questions the plaintiffs wanted in order to elicit jurors' potential biases 
regarding medical malpractice claims and tort reform. Instead, as in this case, the court 
decided to ask more general questions. Id., ^j 5-7. The jury returned a verdict finding 
the defendant not negligent. 
The Alcazar court was very clear as to why the trial court's voir dire procedure 
was both erroneous and prejudicial. First, the court discussed its holding in Evans, in 
which the trial court had asked a line of general questions regarding fairness and 
impartiality that "was only effective in identifying proper for-cause challenges." Such 
narrow questioning was insufficient, this Court held: 
The trial court's questions did not allow the plaintiff an opportunity to 
know which of the prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform 
13 
propaganda, totally aside from whether the prospective jurors would 
themselves admit such exposure had changed their attitudes or biased them. 
Essentially, we concluded that the trial judge's line of questions ignored the 
plaintiffs need to gather information to assist in exercising her peremptory 
challenges. 
Alcazar, 2008 UT App 222, |^12 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 
In Barrett, this Court again reversed a trial court's refusal to ask about exposure to 
tort reform information, depriving the plaintiff of "information necessary both to detect 
actual bias and to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges." Id., U 13, quoting 
Barrett, 868 P.2d at 102 n.7. In both Evans and Barrett, the Alcazar court noted, the 
plaintiffs had not been given an opportunity to "determine which, if any, prospective 
jurors had been exposed to tort reform propaganda, much less whether that exposure 
produced hidden or subconscious biases affecting the jurors' ability to render a fair and 
impartial verdict." Id, at % 14. 
Alcazar then observed that, under Evans and Barrett, "our inquiry does not end 
once we have established that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to ask any 
meaningful tort reform . . . questions during voir dire." Id. at \\5. Once the 
determination has been made that a party was substantially impaired in its right to 
exercise peremptory challenges, "[w]e will reverse if, considering the totality of the 
questioning, counsel was not afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate the jurors. Id. at f 15 (internal citations to quotes omitted). 
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In Alcazar, the only question the trial court asked specifically regarding tort 
reform was: "Has any of you or a close friend or relative personally formed an opinion 
either in favor or opposed to tort reform or been a member of any organization that has?" 
Id, at [^18. As in this case, most of the other questions were designed to uncover general 
biases and prejudice. However, the trial court "allowed the potential jurors to be 
questioned as to both their experience with doctors and hospitals and any negative 
aspects of this experience." Id. Based on these facts, the Alcazar court concluded that 
the "trial court simply left Plaintiffs' counsel without the necessary information needed to 
ferret out a potential juror's actual bias or to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges, 
thus prejudicing Plaintiffs." Id. The Court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to 
the restrictive voir dire. Id. at \\ 18-19. 
Just as in Alcazar, the trial court in this case rejected Plaintiffs specific tort-
reform questions, and instead asked a few generic "yes/no" questions which did nothing 
more than elicit obvious answers. After declining to elicit information as to jurors' 
prejudices regarding lawsuits and tort reform, the court then allowed defense counsel to 
appeal to those very prejudices by specifically referring to an unrelated lawsuit that is the 
"poster child" of tort reform propaganda {see infra). 
Compounding the prejudice, the trial court allowed voir dire questions that were 
beneficial to the Defendant in exercising its peremptory strikes. At trial, the only issue 
was the amount of damages to be awarded from an automobile / pedestrian accident in 
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which back injuries were alleged. The trial court asked specific questions regarding both 
automobile /pedestrian accidents and back injuries. For those who answered these two 
questions in the affirmative, the trial court followed up with "who," "what," "where," 
"when," and "how" inquiries. (R. 693 at pp 30-33; 45-47) Not surprisingly, Defendant 
used two of his three peremptory strikes on a juror who had a close friend who was 
involved in an auto accident who suffered back and neck injuries (R. 693 at 30, 31), and 
another juror who suffers from neck and back injuries from an automobile accident (R. 
693 at 45, 46). (The Jury List including the peremptory information is at R. 537). 
Under this court's "prior, clear precedents," the trial court erred in declining to 
question prospective jurors about tort reform. This error was severely prejudicial, 
particularly under the circumstances of this case, and the judgment should be reversed. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ALLOWING DEFENDANT 
TO REFER TO THE "MCDONALD'S CASE" IN CLOSING 
ARGUMNENT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
At trial, having admitted liability for causing the accident, the defendant focused 
on casting Mr. Boyle in a negative light for requesting a substantial amount of money for 
his injuries. To emphasize the point, in closing argument defense counsel compared Mr. 
Boyle's claim to the damages awarded by the jury in the McDonald's coffee case: 
Ms. Van Orman: It's a per diem analysis. How many days has it been 
since the accident? How many days for the rest of his life? And how much 
6
 11. Have you, any close family member or close friend ever been involved in an 
automobile /pedestrian accident? (R. 536) 
7
 12. Have you, any close family member or close friend ever sustained back injuries? 
(R. 536) 
16 
per day is that worth? That's what been done here. That's how we get 
verdicts like in the McDonald's case with a cup of coffee. 
R. 695: p. 48:17-22) 
Plaintiffs counsel objected that the McDonald's case was not in evidence and the 
reference was prejudicial, but the objection was overruled. (R. 695: pp. 48:23-49:5). 
The jury returned a very low verdict of only $62,500, which included medical expenses 
and only $27,800 for general damages. 
No evidence was presented in this case (nor would it have been proper) regarding 
Liebeckv. McDonald's, et al, D-202-CV-9302419 (N.M. - Albuquerque District 1994), 
also known as the "McDonald's coffee case." In the fourteen years since the (in)famous 
punitive damages verdict was rendered in Liebeck, it has become a "powerful cultural 
icon" and acquired "great symbolic significance" in the tort reform debate, "Java Jive: 
Genealogy of a Juridical Icon," 56 U. Miami L. Rev. 113, 114 (2001), largely through 
misreporting and misstatements of the actual facts of the case. Id, pp. 118-162.8 
Utah law is quite clear regarding the use of unrelated commentary in closing 
argument that is not supported by the evidence. In State of Utah v. Alonzo, supra, two 
defendants were accused, and later found guilty, of assaulting a police office and one of 
interfering with an arrest. In his closing argument, their counsel attempted to draw 
parallels between their case and the controversial Rodney King case in Los Angeles. 973 
o 
Defendant's closing argument in this case perpetuated this trend, suggesting to the jury 
that the (pre-remittitur) punitive damage award that caused such consternation in Liebeck 
somehow resulted from a per diem compensatory damage argument. 
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P.2d at 981. The trial court precluded references to the King case, and both this Court 
and the Utah Supreme court upheld that ruling. "We have held in the past that attorneys 
have broad latitude in presenting closing arguments," the Supreme Court wrote, "but that 
such latitude does not extend to counsel calling the jury's attention to material that the 
jury would not be justified in considering in its verdict." Id. (emphasis added). 
The error was especially prejudicial in this case. Because the defendant admitted 
liability, the trial was entirely focused on the damages to be awarded. The "McDonald's 
coffee case" comment was not directed to a peripheral issue at trial, it was directed to the 
main and only issue being decided, the proper amount of damages to award to a plaintiff 
who needed back surgery after being struck by a vehicle. Counsel's comment was the 
exclamation point to the defense theory that the Plaintiffs damages claims were 
excessive, with the defense comparing Mr. Boyle's damages calculation directly to a case 
widely perceived by the lay public as a lawsuit in which excessive damages were 
awarded. {See, e.g., the Liebeck v. Mcdonald's Restaurants Wikipedia entry9 (noting 
characterization of Liebeck case as "the poster child of excessive lawsuits").)10 
As noted supra, Plaintiff had not been afforded an opportunity to explore jurors' 
views on tort reform and possible biases derived therefrom. Defendant's reference to 
9
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liebeck_v._McDonald's_Restaurants (last accessed 
November 23, 2008). 
10
 Even if the trial court had ruled correctly that the improper comment should have been 
stricken, the damage was done and the point was made. By intentionally choosing the 
most notorious tort reform case, the defendant made his point, but also led the trial court 
into inherently prejudicial error. 
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Liebeck was unabashedly intended to inflame jurors' pre-existing prejudices regarding 
allegedly frivolous lawsuits, after Plaintiff had been precluded from exploring the extent 
of those prejudices. Either in conjunction with Argument I or standing on its own, 
defense counsel's express invocation of the McDonald's coffee case in closing argument 
was irreparably prejudicial in this context, and a new trial is warranted. 
III. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT TO 
ALLOW NORRINE BOYLE'S LOSS OF CONSORTIUM 
CLAIMS TO REACH THE JURY. 
After Mr. Boyle filed his initial complaint alleging that defendant was responsible 
for the accident in which he was injured, his spouse, Norrine Boyle, was added as a 
plaintiff to assert a claim for loss of consortium pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11. 
Prior to trial, the trial court granted the defense's M o t ^ in Limine to Dismiss Norrine 
Boyle's claim, ruling as a matter of law that the plaintiffs' evidence did not meet the 
statutory threshold for bringing a consortium claim in Utah. (R.532-34) 
The statute at issue states, in part: 
30-2-11. Action for consortium due to personal injury. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "injury" or injured" means a significant permanent injury to a 
person that substantially changes that person's lifestyle and includes 
the following: 
(i) a partial or complete paralysis pf one or more of the 
extremities; 
(ii) significant disfigurement; or 
(iii) incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs 
the person performed before the injury; and 
(b) "spouse" means the legal relationship: 
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(i) established between a man and a woman as recognized by 
the laws of this state; and 
(ii) existing at the time of the person's injury. 
The defense did not argue that Norrine Boyle was not John Boyle's "spouse," nor 
claim that Mr. Boyle's herniated disk which necessitated back surgery and still causes 
him ongoing pain was not a "significant permanent injury" that "changes that person's 
lifestyle". Rather, the defendant focused primarily on §30-2-11 (a)(iii), regarding 
whether Mr. Boyle is capable of "performing the types of jobs the person performed 
before the injury". 
As the defense's "motion in limine" was, in actuality, a motion for summary 
judgment on Mrs. Boyle's claims, the trial court could grant the motion only if there was 
"no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party [was] entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). When reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, the facts and reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party. Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Gary Porter 
Construction v. Fox Construction, 101 P.3d 371, 374; 2004 UT App 354 ^ 10. 
Mrs. Boyle was not deposed; therefore the factual basis regarding the consortium 
claim was found in John Boyle's deposition testimony. Specifically regarding whether 
he is capable of performing jobs he could perform before the automobile/pedestrian 
accident, Mr. Boyle testified: 
Q. Okay. Is your work restricted currently? Are you able to do your 
job without any problems? 
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A. My lack of sleep causes problems in everything I do. I get frustrated 
much more quickly, I don't have endurance, I don't work eight hours 
a day because six is about all I can handle and some days I can't 
handle that. I wake up tired every day. Very often I try to go back 
to bed - not to bed, to the recliner for ten or 15 minutes just so that I 
can function. 
So that permeates everything I do and in lots of different ways. 
(R.261: 12-21) 
Q. Okay. What about your back, does your back prevent you from 
doing anything at work? 
A. Not at that work. I do work at the golf course on Saturday mornings 
from a half hour before daylight until 10:00 o'clock. 
Q. What do you do there? 
A. I bring out the carts, the golf carts, and tend the shop, the pro shop. 
And I find that I can't lift two buckets of balls. They might be eight 
pounds each. I can't lift two of them at once. By the end of the shift 
my back really hurts and I go home and get in the recliner for a 
couple of hours just so that it won't hurt so much. 
(R. 262: 10-22). 
It is apparent from the language of the statute that the legislature was only 
interested in allowing a consortium claim where serious, ongoing injuries were involved 
in order to avoid soft, frivolous claims. Viewed in the light most favorable to Mrs. 
Boyle, the evidence adduced in opposition to defendant's motion in limine reflected that 
Mr. Boyle, after his back surgery, is suffering from ongoing pain issues that are extensive 
enough that he is incapable of sleeping anywhere other than in a recliner, is suffering 
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from recurring sleep deprivation causing an inability to work full-time at a sedentary job, 
and is unable to even lift a small amount of weight at his slightly less than sedentary job 
at the golf course. Even with very little physical exertion delivering golf carts and 
staffing a golf shop, he is still in enough pain after just a few hours that he has to go 
home and rest for a couple of hours to alleviate the pain. 
An automobile/pedestrian accident that caused a herniated disk, necessitated back 
surgery, and still causes ongoing pain is unquestionably a "significant permanent injury" 
that "changes that person's lifestyle". It is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute 
that Mr. Boyle must be incapable of "performing the types of jobs the person performed 
before the injury" at all. Rather, it meets the language and intent of the legislation if he is 
impaired in his ability to perform the job to the same degree and extent that he could 
prior to the incident. 
Nothing in the statute requires that an individual must be bedridden before his 
spouse may maintain a claim for loss of consortium. Rather, the language supports the 
argument that Mr. Boyle's ability to perform his job or jobs must be materially affected 
by his injury. The facts adduced on that issue were sufficient to meet the statutory 
threshold, and to allow the jury to determine how and whether to award damages to Mrs. 
Boyle under these circumstances. The dismissal of her claims prior to trial was error, and 
the case should be remanded for trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellants respectfully request the Court to reverse 
the judgment and remand the case for a new trial on the claims of John Boyle and 
Norrine Boyle. 
rt 
DATED this 24 day of November, 2008. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
#oge 
Scot A. Boyd 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the ^ 7 day of November, 2008, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed, first-class postage 
prepaid, to: 
Kristin A. VanOrman, 7333 
Jeremy G. Knight, 10722 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P 
Roger P. Gririsfensen 
Scot A. Boyd 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
24 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1 - Minutes 5/19/08 and Order Dismissing Norrine Boyle's 
Claim. 
Exhibit 2 - Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Questionnaire 
Exhibit 3 - Judge's Voir Dire Questions 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN BOYLE, 
vs . 
Plaintiff, 
KERRY CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
RULING FROM 5/19/08 
Case No: 050912506 PI 
Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Date: May 21, 2008 
Clerk: tinaa 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROGER P CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KRISTIN A VAN ORMAN 
Video 
Tape Number: 8.16-8.30 
HEARING 
This matter is before the Court for a Ruling from the Oral 
Argument heard on 5/19/08. Appearances as stated above. 
1. Defendants Motion in Limine to Dismiss Plaintiff Norrme 
Boyle's Loss of Consortium Claim is Granted. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Strike Lyle B Mason's Expert Testimony 
is Denied. 
3. Defendant's Motion to Strike Helen Woodward as an Expert 
Witness is granted. 
Kristin Van Orman is to prepare an Order with in 1 week. The 
Court would like this Order to be approved as to form. 
Page 1 (last) 
Kristin A. VanOrman (#7333) 
Jeremy G. Knight (#10722) 
STRONG AND HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801)532-7080 
Facsimile: (801)596-1508 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN BOYLE, 
vs. 
KERRY CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No.050912506 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
This matter came before the Court on May 19, 2008 for Defendant's motions in 
limine seeking to exclude Helen Woodard and Dr. Lyle Mason as expert witnesses as well 
as Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff Norrine Boyle's claims for loss of consortium. 
Oral argument was held with Roger Christensen in attendance for the plaintiffs and Kristin 
VanOrman representing the defendant. 
After review of the submitted briefs as well as considering oral argument, this Court 
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
001143 00262 
fiL 
1. Defendant's motion to exclude Helen Woodard is granted. Ms. Woodard's report 
was produced late in the proceedings in violation of this Court's case management 
order. 
2. Defendant's motion to exclude Dr. Lyle Mason is denied. Defense counsel is to be 
given the opportunity to depose Dr. Mason prior to the trial of this matter. 
3. Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff Norrine Boyle's claim for loss of consortium 
is granted. It is the Court's ruling that the plaintiffs do not meet the statutory 
requirements for bringing a claim for loss of consortium and therefore such a claim 
is hereby dismissed. 
DATED this ±^_ day of May, 2008. 
*«v' o - ^ t ' ^ 
Approvers to form: 
001143 00262 -2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
m The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ^ ^ day of May, 2008, \ irue and 
direct copy ol 11 le foregoing ORDER was served by mail, postage fully prepaid, upon the 
following: 
Roger P. Christensen 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN 
15 West South Temple, Suite HI Hi 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
001143 00262 - 3 -
Roger P. Christensen, #0648 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)323-5000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
FILED DISTRICT 00UHT 
Third Judicial District 
JUNE'S 2008 
^ 
AKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN BOYLE and NORRINE BOYLE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KERRY CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant. 
l'LAUN TIFF'S REQUEST FOR THE 
SUBMISSION OF A JURY 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND FOR 
REASONABLE FOLLOW UP VOIR DIRE 
Case No: 050912506 
Judge: Tyrone E. Medley 
Plaintiff hereby requests the Court to have the attached questionnaire completed by the 
potential jurors in this case, with copies provided to the Court and counsel, prior to the jury 
selection process. 
Plaintiff also requests the Court to all >laintiffs' counsel the opportunity to ask 
reasonable jury voir dire questions following up on the individual jurors answers to the 
questionnaire. Plaintiff also requests the Court to allow plaintiffs' counsel to address the 
following additional areas with individual jurors injury voir dire: 
1. The juror's willingness and/or reluctance to follow the law, as instructed by the 
Court, in spite of personal disagreement with it. 
DATED this 
Experience, training, knowledge and insights regarding people who have 
sustained some level of back injury and/or chronic pain. 
ay of April, 2008. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN^C. 
*er FjpBfistensen 
Attor&dyfor Plaintiffs 
5fl 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this \p day of | ^ p r 1 \ , 2008 a copy of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR THE SUBMISSION OF A JURY QUESTIONAIRE AND FOR 
REASONABLE FOLLOW UP VOIR DIRE was mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Kristin A. Van Orman 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
SA 
me liiiurmaiion given in this questionnaire is confidential and will be used only to assist with jury 
selection in this case. 
JUROR NAME: AGE: JUROR #: 
1 tf. What is the highest grade that you 
completed in school? 
If college, please list any degrees 
received: 
4. What are your feelings or opinions 
about people who bring personal injury 
lawsuits? 
If supported by the evidence, could you 
award a large amount of money to the 
plaintiff in this case? 
1 7. Do you believe the law should impose 
limits on money that can be awarded for 
pain and suffering: 
• Yes D No 
If YES, what do you believe these 
limitations should be? 
V. Where do you work and what is your 
job title? ' 
What jobs have you held in the past? 
What jobs has your spouse or significant 
other held in the past? 
X If you were seriously hurt or injured 
^by the negligence of another, would you 
sue? 
Please explain your answer: 
'.8. Have you ever been the plaintiff (the 
party suing) or a defendant (the party 
being sued) in a lawsuit? • Yes • No 
If YES, please explain: 
Ax. Circle any of the following in which 
you have received training or education: 
Business Law 
Engineering Psychology 
Health/Medicine Statistics 
Insurance Teaching 
Accident Investigation 
6. If supported by the evidence, could 
you award money damages for 
a. Future physical pain • Yes • No 
b. Mental anguish • Yes • No 
c. The impact on a wife of partially 
disabling injuries to her husband? 
d. Future medical bills • Yes • No 
If you answered NO to any of the above, 
please explain: 
^9. Have you ever served as a juror in a ] 
civil case? • Yes • No 
If YES, what type of civil case was it? 
What was the verdict in that case? 
Were you the foreperson? • Yes • No 
Do you have any negative feelings as a 
result of your experience as a juror? 
• Yes • No 
If YES, please explain: 
10, What are your 3 favorite TV shows? 
1. 
2. 
! 3 -
What newspapers, magazines, or journals 
do you read regularly? 
13. Which of the following words would 
you use to describe yourself? Please 
check all that apply: 
D Analytical D Old-fashioned 
D Careful D Open-minded 
D Compassionate D Pro-business 
j D Detail-oriented • Pro-consumer 
D Emotional D Sensitive 
D Frugal D Skeptical 
O Generous D Suspicious 
D Impulsive D Visual 
D Judgmental D Worrier 
\\X. What groups or organizations do 
you/loved ones/family members belong 
to? 
\4. What do you enjoy doing in your 
spare time? 
Do you consider yourself to be: 
D Conservative D Moderate D Liberal 
Who makes the financial decisions in 
your home? 
Who writes the checks or pays the bills 
in your home? 
X. 
L&v. List 3 people you admire the most: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
List 3 people you admire the least: 
1. 
2. 
-> 
15. Is there any reason you could not 
serve as a juror in this case? 
D Yes D No 
If YES, please explain: 
Add any comments you wish to make: 
I hereby swear or affirm that all the answers contained in this juror questionnaire are true and correct. 
Juror's Signature Date 
1. 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
7 
8 . 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
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